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The Cost Impact of Spam Filters: Measuring the Effect of 
Information System Technologies in Organizations
*
 
More than 70% of global e-mail traffic consists of unsolicited and commercial direct 
marketing, also known as spam. Dealing with spam incurs high costs for organizations, 
prompting efforts to try to reduce spam-related costs by installing spam filters. Using modern 
econometric methods to reduce the selection bias of installing a spam filter, we deploy a 
unique data setting implemented at a German university to measure the costs associated 
with spam and the costs savings of spam filters. The applied methodological framework can 
easily be transferred to estimate the effect of other IS technologies (e.g., SAP) implemented 
in organizations. Our findings indicate that central IT costs are of little relevance since the 
majority of spam costs stem from employees who spend working time identifying and deleting 
spam. The working time losses caused by spam are approximately 1,200 minutes per 
employee per year; these costs could be reduced by roughly 35% through the installation of a 
spam filter mechanism. The individual efficiency of a spam filter installation depends on the 
amount of spam that is received and on the level of knowledge about spam. 
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1 is defined as the use of electronic communication channels to send unsolicited bulk 
messages  with  commercial  content  indiscriminately  to  recipients  (OECD  2005).  However, 
whether an e-mail is perceived as spam depends on the preferences of the user; some believe that 
the opportunity offered is a good deal and will purchase the promoted product. Thus, spamming 
continues to be a profitable business. Even with low purchasing probabilities, spamming can be 
economically viable because the variable operating costs of using online communication channels 
are close to zero. Furthermore, already low market entry costs continue to decline because of 
strong price competition among e-mail list providers, which offer millions of validated e-mail 
addresses for prices less than US$50 (Sipior, Ward, and Bonner 2004; Hann et al. 2006).  
Spammers rely on various business models, either selling their (validated) e-mail address lists 
to other spammers, or directly promoting their own or third-party products. Mostly, they adver-
tise third-party products using a revenue share model. The profit depends on the product, timing 
of the campaign, opening rate, and purchase probability, which is influenced by the quality of the 
spam mail. Potentially high profits and low market entry barriers continuously attract spammers, 
even though legal actions against spam have been initiated by legislation (Zhang 2005). Since 
October 2003, more than 50% of the total global mail traffic has been classified as spam, and in 
January 2008, the quota was greater than 75% (Messagelabs 2008).  
Spamming is accompanied by negative externalities, with the largest share of the costs asso-
ciated with sending unsolicited bulk messages being borne by e-mail service providers and those 
                                                 
1 The association between unsolicited bulk e-mail and the word “spam” derives from a comedy sketch by the British 
comedy group Monty Python, in which the name of Hormel Foods’ meat product “spam” gets mentioned about a 
hundred times within just a few minutes.   
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who receive spam (Melville et al. 2006; Goodman, Cormack, and Heckerman 2007). As a result, 
large e-mail providers must handle billions of “abusive mails” per day (MAAWG 2007). Organi-
zations complain about the costs of spam, which reduces their employees’ productivity by forcing 
employees to allocate their limited attention resources to the messages (Falkinger 2007). Thus, 
the spamming phenomenon affects individuals (in organizations) as well as economies on a glob-
al scale; in response, technical, market, and legal actions seek to reduce the costs of spam (OECD 
2005; Joseph and Thevaranjan 2008).  
Despite the strong interest in reducing the costs of spam, we find only limited academic re-
search that addresses the effectiveness of anti-spam actions on costs (Joseph and Thevaranjan 
2008; Pavlov, Melville, and Plice 2008). A variety of management-related studies conducted by 
consulting companies (e.g., Vircom 2004) measure a few indices on a corporate level and then 
generalize these costs or break them down to an individual level. However, precise measures of 
individual or corporate costs (e.g., from data centers) that assess the magnitude of the problem 
have not been subject to academic consideration. Most spam-related research focuses instead on 
mechanisms to reduce spam or its impact. This type of literature can be grouped in four streams: 
First, theoretical papers by economists analyze and model market mechanisms to overcome the 
externalities of spam by increasing the costs for the sender (e.g., Kraut et al. 2005). Second, sig-
nificant research focuses on legal issues to increase the risk (and cost) for spammers (e.g., Zhang 
2005). Third, another stream of literature addresses user perceptions of spam (e.g., Morimoto and 
Chang 2006). Fourth, literature found in the field of information systems and computer science 
contributes ways to enhance filtering technologies by identifying, marking, and filtering unsoli-
cited e-mails (e.g., Cormack and Lynam 2007). The effect of market mechanisms and legal ac-
tions are long term and typically beyond the control of IS managers, whereas most individuals 
and organizations use filter technologies to reduce the amount of spam in inboxes. However, de- 
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spite the widespread use of spam filters, no study—to our knowledge—empirically addresses the 
question whether or not spam filters or other countermeasures really reduce costs.  
This dearth of research is especially surprising for two reasons: First, with regard to the cor-
porate level, company investments in information technology involve high risk and unclear out-
comes (Dewan, Shi, and Gurbaxani 2007; Dewan and Ren 2007). Second, although spam filters 
are designed to reduce the spam burden and thus spam-related costs, this desired effect does not 
necessarily occur; the net benefit of the adoption and usage of spam filters depends on the costs 
of installation and the sum of time losses due to updating and training the filter, as well as for 
checking the filter results regarding potential misclassifications (false positives/negatives). Thus, 
although spam filters help users identify spam, they also lead to new costs due to two reasons: (1) 
filter technology may not be sufficient enough to justify the recurring costs after installation (e.g., 
updates and training of the filter), and (2) substantial misclassifications of relevant e-mails occur 
because filters are not sufficiently trained by individuals. Therefore, the individual net cost effect 
remains an open issue, and it remains unclear whether spam filters do indeed reduce costs.  
We address this research gap and pursue two major research aims. First, we measure the cen-
tral and individual costs of spam in an organization to evaluate the magnitude of the spam prob-
lem. Second, we take a first step towards evaluating the efficiency of countermeasures by focus-
ing on spam filters. Without a controlled experimental setting, evaluating the cost effects of spam 
filters in cross-sectional samples requires rigorous control for the presence of a selection bias, 
which could arise because respondents using a spam filter might have different characteristics 
than those who do not. For example: In our data we find that users of spam filters have higher 
spam costs than those who do not use a filter. This raises the question of causality: Do users in-
stall filters because of high spam costs, or do filters cause rather than reduce costs as noted 
above? Ignoring this selection effect would lead to biased results pertaining to the effect of spam  
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filters with a typical cross-sectional sample. Therefore, we reduce this selection bias by drawing 
on a propensity score-matching procedure (Imbens 2004; Smith and Todd 2005).  
To measure the effect of spam filters on the individual costs of spam, we collected data from 
a German university and differentiate between the individual costs of the employees and the costs 
to the university’s central data center. Our data set comprises information regarding 1,000 em-
ployees.  
Our research contributes to IS literature in two dimensions: First, the nature of our data set 
(which includes individual and organizational costs) enables us to provide an indication of the 
costs of spam on both individual and corporate levels, as well as to show the impact of spam fil-
ters on individual costs. Second, because of the likely presence of a sample selection bias in 
many IS research settings focusing on the impact of implemented IT interventions in organiza-
tions (e.g., the introduction of SAP), we demonstrate the application of propensity score match-
ing, and provide guidelines and implications for its extension to other research questions. Thus, 
our methodological framework can be applied to many other settings that focus on estimating the 
success of IS interventions when experiments are not feasible.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In the next section, we present a 
brief overview of related research. We then introduce the method utilized to quantify the cost-
saving effects of spam filters by correcting for selection bias. Section 4 summarizes the structure 
of the field experiment we conducted to estimate the costs of spam, and presents some descriptive 






Contrary to the public presence of the spam phenomenon, academic research has devoted 
minimal attention to researching spam-related costs. Previous publications include reports by the 
OECD (2005) and the European Union (2004). The latter categorizes costs incurred by spam into 
direct and indirect costs, distinguishing between five different cost components. Direct costs in-
clude (1) losses of working time and productivity caused by the need to delete spam and install 
and train filters, and (2) central costs that accrue in data centers and IT departments as a result of 
the installation of countermeasures. Furthermore, (3) direct costs may arise if Internet service 
providers (ISP) must adapt their capacities to respond to increased spam. Indirect costs refer to 
the effect of spam on e-mail usage: (4) e-mails can be erroneously identified as spam (false posi-
tives) or (5) might contain viruses or other potentially harmful features (European Union 2004). 
Several of these cost components are directly caused by the decision to adopt a spam filter: the 
installation and training of filter mechanisms, the central costs, and the control of the spam filter 
especially for false positives. Only if these costs do not exceed the cost savings achieved by the 
filter will a spam filter mechanism have the desired effect.  
Despite these numerous consequences, academic research invests little effort into quantifying 
spam-related costs, especially with regard to possible cost-saving (or cost-causing) effects asso-
ciated with the widespread use of spam filters. Existing research primarily addresses ways to re-
duce the amount of spam and can be grouped into four streams. The first major stream addresses 
a key characteristic of electronic communication, namely, the low marginal costs of e-mail distri-
bution. This characteristic represents the primary reason for the existence of spam, because in the 
offline world, the sender-pays system prevents advertisers from engaging in heavy spamming. In 
the online world however, the sender does not bear significant costs for excessive mailings; in- 
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stead, those costs are externalized to ISPs and recipients, which characterizes e-mailing as a digi-
tal commons (Melville et al. 2006). Economists attempt to reduce the potential for externalizing 
the costs associated with e-mailing by confronting spammers with greater e-mailing costs. This 
would make spam less attractive, thus changing the economics of e-mailing. For example, one 
approach involves e-mail postage (Kraut et al. 2005), and another proposes a bonded sender pro-
gram that requires senders to deposit a certain amount of money if not listed on a white list. If the 
recipient declares the e-mail to be spam, the deposit gets retained (Joseph and Thevaranjan 2008). 
Despite their theoretical efficiency, these and other comparable approaches could not yet be im-
plemented. The considerable coordination effort associated with these measures makes it doubt-
ful whether this gap will change in the near future. 
The  second  cluster  of  literature deals  with  legal measures  against spam.  However,  these 
measures have the inherent limitation that, in many cases, spammers set the pace for technical 
developments (Melville et al. 2006). Furthermore, legal measures are sustainable only if they are 
coordinated on a global basis. Since such coordination is rare, it cannot be expected that legal 
countermeasures will have a sustainable impact on costs (Zhang 2005).  
A strong basis in the third literature stream suggests the implementation of technical meas-
ures against spam, whether implemented centrally (e.g., IT department or ISP) or decentralized 
(on each user’s computer). Research focuses on technical issues such as blocking IP numbers, 
filtering e-mails, or authentication mechanisms (e.g., Sahami et al. 1998; Park and Deshpande 
2006; Duan, Dong, and Gopalan 2007; Cormack and Lynam 2007).  
A nascent, fourth stream of literature explores user perceptions of the growing spam burden 
by measuring the attitude or inconvenience costs of spam (Yoo, Shin, and Kwak 2006; Morimoto 
and Chang 2006). However, none of these publications addresses the effect of technical measures  
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on the development of spam-related costs. Our research relates to the last two groups of publica-
tions, in that we focus on both the costs and user perceptions of filter mechanisms.  
Method 
Our research goal is to shed light on the unresolved issue of whether the installation of a 
spam filter reduces working time losses experienced by employees. A suitable framework to ad-
dress such a question is the potential outcome approach also known as the Roy-Rubin model 
(Roy 1951; Rubin 1974). To measure the individual causal effect of a spam filter we seek to 
compare working times – with and without a spam filter – for the same user at the same time. Let 
the potential outcomes – here working time losses in minutes – be defined as Yi(Di) for each indi-
vidual i and let Di denote the treatment indicator – here: installation of a spam filter. The individ-
ual causal effect is simply the difference between both potential outcomes, hence: Yi(1)-Yi(0).
2 
Unfortunately, one of these potential outcomes is unobservable or counterfactual, so instead, we 
consider comparing the mean working time losses of employees before and after they install the 
spam filter. However, relying solely on this approach would also be problematic, because em-
ployees could change their behavior, e.g., by making an initial online purchase or subscribing to a 
newsletter. Furthermore, external circumstances might change as well, such as an overall increase 
in Internet usage due to new and faster connections. Therefore, solely comparing a situation to-
day (installed spam filter) with a situation in the past (no spam filter) could be very misleading as 
a result of unobserved effects over time.  
Another approach is to compare the mean working times of those employees who have in-
stalled a spam filter (i.e., the “treatment  group” hereafter) and those who have not (“control 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Heckman, LaLonde, Smith (1999) or Imbens (2004) for a detailed discussion of the evaluation framework.  
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group”). In an experimental setting, i.e., where the installation of spam filters is randomly as-
signed, this would be a feasible strategy (Harrison and List 2004). However, such an experimen-
tal setting is not an option in the case of spam filters or comparable technological investments for 
most companies. Further, our empirical data (see Tables 3-5 in the following Section) indicates 
that users with a spam filter differ in more aspects then just the decision to install a filter, such 
that simply comparing mean working times of the treatment and the control group would yield a 
biased estimate of the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT) denoted by  ATT τ :  
[ (1)| 1] [ (0)| 1] [ (0)| 1] [ (0)| 0] ATT E Y D E Y D E Y D E Y D τ = − = = + = − = .  (1) 
The  difference  between  the  left-hand  expression  and  the  ATT τ   can  be  called  the  “self-
selection bias”. It is reasonable to assume that users with high spam-related costs have a higher 
propensity to install spam filters. For example, those who use their e-mail frequently probably 
differ from those who use it irregularly. To make meaningful comparisons and estimate the caus-
al  effects  of  the  spam  filter,  we  must  find  a  proper  substitute  for  the  unobservable  compo-
nent [ (0)| 0] E Y D = . 
To address the self-selection problem, we assume that potential working time losses are in-
dependent of the installation decision, given a set of relevant, observable variables X (Conditional 
Independence Assumption).
3 By referring to relevant variables, we mean that they simultaneously 
influence the decision to install a spam filter and the outcome variable. So selection must be sole-
ly due to observable variables, which is generally a strong assumption. Even though we are con-
fident that our data covers the crucial X variables to justify this assumption, we subsequently test 
the sensitivity of our results to this assumption. With a large set of variables X and a small sample 
                                                 
3 See Imbens (2004) for an overview of different nonparametric estimation approaches to average treatment effects 
under exogeneity.   
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of users (as is the case in our data), it is difficult to find users from the control group who have 
exactly the same variable values as each user in the treatment group. Therefore, we follow Ro-
senbaum and Rubin (1983) who have shown that it is sufficient to use the propensity score P(X) – 
here: the probability of installing a spam filter – instead of the whole set of observed characteris-
tics X in order to balance the distribution of covariates between both groups. 
The basic idea behind propensity score matching (PSM) is to approximate the counterfactual 
working times of individuals in the treatment group by finding similar users in terms of their pro-
pensity score values in the control group. Formally, the PSM estimator can be written as: 
)] ( , 0 | ) 0 ( [ )] ( , 1 | ) 1 ( [ 1 )| ( X P D Y E X P D Y E D X P
PSM
ATT = − = = = τ .  (2) 
It  is  simply  the  mean  difference  in  outcomes  over  the  common  support,  appropriately 
weighted by the propensity score of the treatment group individuals. Restricting the comparison 
to individuals who fall inside the region of common support ensures that only comparable indi-
viduals, whose propensity score values overlap, are used to estimate the treatment effect. To en-
sure that users from the control group have a positive probability of belonging to the treatment 
group, we further assume that P(D=1|X) < 1 (Overlap Assumption). 
Based on these two assumptions we can use PSM to estimate the average treatment effect of 
the treated (Heckman et al. 1998). The most straightforward matching estimator is nearest neigh-
bor (NN) matching. For each user from the treatment group, we choose one user from the control 
group who is closest in terms of the propensity score. In addition, NN matching can be done with 
or without replacement. In the former case, a user from the control group can appear more than 
once as a matching partner; in the latter case a user is considered only once. Whereas NN match-
ing algorithms use only a few observations from the control group to construct the counterfactual 
outcome for each treated individual, Kernel matching (KM) is a nonparametric matching estima- 
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tor that uses weighted averages of (nearly) all individuals from the control group. Because KM 
estimators use more of the available information to estimate causal effects, lower variances are 
achieved. However, this method also employs users from the control group, though they are po-
tentially poor matches reflecting the trade-off between bias and efficiency. It should be clear that 
the imposition of the common support condition is very important for KM. Different criteria for 
imposing common support are available
4; we use the “MinMax” criterion, according to which 
users from the treatment group whose PS is higher (smaller) than the maximum (minimum) PS in 
the control group are dropped from the analysis. This highlights the great advantage of PSM 
compared with ordinary least squares regression (OLS).  With PSM and the common support 
condition, the treatment effects are estimated only within the common support, so individuals for 
individuals without comparable matches are excluded. The estimated treatment effect must then 
be interpreted over the region of common support.  
Below we briefly describe the data that was gathered to determine the cost-saving effects of 
the individual decision to install a spam filter. 
Research Design and Data 
We conduct our research at a German university with approximately 8,000 employees (in-
cluding the university’s hospitals), whose size resembles that of a medium-sized company.
5 A 
unique advantage of this setting results from the integrated structure of the institution, which 
combines most sources for spam-related costs into one organization: the university serves as an e-
mail provider, operates its own data center, and employs a sufficiently high number of computer 
users. Our data collection can thus be restricted to two points of measurement within the universi-
                                                 
4 See Smith and Todd (2005) and Lechner (2002) for an overview. 
5 Universities previously have served as research settings for spam research (e.g., Melville et al. 2006).  
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ty: (1) We measure all central costs incurred by the university data center, where all computer-
related tasks are centralized, and (2) we contact 5,000 university employees (excluding the uni-
versity’s hospitals) to measure the individual costs using an online questionnaire that also con-
tains a set of covariates. 
Central Costs 
We collect information about the expenses incurred by the provider through interviews with 
IT experts from the university data center. The data center had reacted to its increasing spam bur-
den  by  setting  up  an  infrastructure  based  on  free  open  source  software  (SpamAssassin)  that 
checks all incoming e-mails for spam properties before labeling them in accordance with their 
spam  probability  and  forwarding  them  to  recipients.  On  average,  the  data  center  processes 
170,000 e-mails per day from outside the university; in 2005 and 2006, the spam quota was about 
90%. 
This infrastructure creates expenses in four categories. Prior to the installation, organizational 
and administrative tasks had to be performed to obtain clearance from all relevant organizational 
units. The expenses for hard- and software were accompanied by labor costs for installing the 
system and training of the staff. In addition, the initiative against spam generates recurring costs, 
because the data center regularly provides support to the university’s e-mail users. Furthermore, 
all anti-spam measures must be controlled for efficiency and are subject to constant further de-
velopment. These activities together create expenses on a regular basis. For the purpose of com-
parability, we aggregate these regular costs for a period of one year. Therefore, the sum of all 
costs (Table 1) equals Euro 15,120 for the first year after and including installation. 




Our second measure pertains to the individual costs to the employees of the university, whom 
we contacted by e-mail in the winter season 2004/2005 to invite them to fill out an online ques-
tionnaire. We contacted 5,000 employees and received exactly 1,000 responses (20%). We note 
that 52.7% of the 1,000 respondents already had adopted a spam filter.  
Adoption research (e.g., theory of reasoned action, technology acceptance model) suggests 
that the perceived utility of an innovation drives adoption behavior—in this case, spam filter in-
stallation. We adopt this view and assume that the propensity to install a spam filter is strongly 
driven by the amount of spam an individual receives. We use this measure as a proxy for the per-
ceived utility of a countermeasure. Furthermore, we measure demographic variables and the indi-
vidual’s own spam-prevention mechanisms. We control for psychographic variables related to the 
user’s reactance to spam and measure the level of distribution of his or her e-mail address to oth-
ers. We rely on these variables to analyze each individual’s decision to install a spam filter.  
Costs. On the basis of interviews we conducted prior to launching the questionnaire, we sepa-
rate recurring from nonrecurring costs. Recurring costs refer to the daily time involved in delet-
ing spam and controlling spam filter results for false positives. For the 1,000 respondents, these 
activities take up an average of 4.87 minutes per day. The nonrecurring costs include inquiries 
about the spam filter and installation by the respondent or an assistant. We aggregate all time 
expenditures into an index that covers the costs for one year, assuming that the average employee 
in Germany works approximately 250 days. Table 2 reports the respective time expenditures, 
indicating an average time loss of more than 1,200 minutes per year. Direct monetary costs on the 
individual level are not included, since the installation of the university spam filter did not require 
any payments by the respondents.  
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Table 2 also shows significantly greater time losses (1,597 minutes per year) for the 527 par-
ticipants that installed a spam filter (D = 1) compared with the loss of 858 minutes for the 473 
participants without one (D = 0). This finding suggests that either a spam filter causes working 
time losses, or that users with high costs have a stronger inclination to install a filter. The latter 
explanation would suggest a sample selection bias. Thus, to measure the potential cost savings of 
spam filters for the 1,000 users, we must reduce the selection bias using appropriate methods.  
>> Insert Table 2 about here << 
Individual Factors. We assume that the most important driver of the adoption decision is the 
amount of spam that each person is confronted with. We further assume heterogeneity exists in 
individuals’ approaches for dealing with spam. We therefore include variables that capture ac-
tions related to spam prevention, such as whether the e-mail address gets used strategically to 
prevent spam. Furthermore, we ask how respondents identify an e-mail as spam (Table 3). The 
descriptive analysis shows significant differences between users with and without spam filters in 
several dimensions. For example, significant differences in age and gender emerge between the 
two groups; we also identify strong differences in the quantity of spam mails received, such that 
those with a spam filter receive more than three times as much spam as those without. Spam filter 
users have a higher propensity to use alternative e-mail addresses and request to be removed from 
mailing lists more often. Finally, spam filter users rely more on inspecting the subject line before 
they open e-mails.  
>> Insert Table 3 about here << 
 
Reactance. Spam not only reduces productivity in the workplace, but can also be perceived 
as intrusive. Prior research associates unsolicited mails with a perceived loss of control that can 
lead to the psychological effect of reactance (Morimoto and Chang 2006). If spam is perceived to  
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be intrusive, thus leading to a sense of loss of control, the recipient might be inclined to take ac-
tions to restore his or her original state, which in this case would be a spam-free environment. 
Therefore, we control for behavioral changes caused by reactance; we also measure individual 
spam sensitivity to control for possible influences and account for the perceived degree of loss of 
control (Table 4). This measure therefore includes properties that, according to the individual, 
constitute the bothersome factors of spam.  
The descriptive results indicate that particularly users with spam filters feel that they have 
wasted significantly more time with, and lost confidence in, the e-mail medium, which then in-
creases reactance because they feel bothered by spam. We also find that filter users are signifi-
cantly more sensitive to what they perceive as spam (e.g., fun mail, ads from business partners, 
large attachments).  Furthermore, we detect significant differences in the perceptions of spam 
properties, such that users without spam filters note significantly higher fears about the potential 
hazards of spam.  
>> Insert Table 4 about here << 
 
Distribution. The last group of variables controls for the usage habits associated with the e-
mail address. We capture the degree to which the e-mail address has been distributed to known or 
unknown contacts, with the assumption that a “generous” distribution of the e-mail address leads 
to a considerably higher spam load, which in turn increases the probability of spam filter installa-
tion (Table 5). The descriptive measures indicate no differences in the distribution of the e-mail 
address to known contacts, but we find significantly higher distribution levels to unknown con-
tacts by those who have installed spam filters. 




Group Characteristics before Matching 
The average working time loss for users with spam filters is 1,597 minutes; for those without 
it is 858 minutes. A simple mean comparison suggests that a spam filter increases working time 
losses by 739 minutes. However, the groups differ in their observed characteristics, as previously 
stated. Users who have installed a spam filter appear to be significantly older and more likely to 
be men. They receive more e-mails (solicited and unsolicited) and exhibit a higher information 
level about spam (see Table 3). As Table 4 reveals, they also have a greater perception that the 
amount of spam mails, wasted time to control spam mails, and mail handling time have risen in 
general. Furthermore, they are less inclined to believe that spam mails can damage their personal 
computers. Finally, these users publish their e-mail addresses on Web sites, in online directories, 
or in online forums more frequently (see Table 5). The large differences in observed characteris-
tics indicate that a simple mean comparison of working time losses between both groups cannot 





The first step of PSM is to estimate the propensity score, which we do using a binary logit 
model.
8 Our dependent variable equals 1 for users that installed a spam filter and 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
6 Although it might seem to be a natural solution to control for other factors contributing to the installation decision 
by running a regression analysis to determine the cost effects of spam filters, this will not solve the issue: standard 
regression analysis does not implement a common support condition, so users with diverse characteristics are com-
pared, and estimates are extrapolated even to regions in which common support (and number of observations) is low. 
Because of this disadvantage, we implement propensity score matching.  
7 See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for practical guidance on how to implement propensity score matching.    
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Table 6 presents the results of the propensity score estimation, including the previously derived 
explanatory variables.
9 We drop those respondents for whom we lack information about the key 
information spam properties from the analysis, reducing the number of observations to 520 users 
who have installed a spam filter and 440 users have not.  
>> Insert Table 6 about here << 
With this logit specification, we achieve a hit rate of 73.1%.
10 However, the aim of the pro-
pensity score estimation is not to maximize the hit rate but rather to balance the covariates be-
tween both groups, which we subsequently test by calculating standardized biases. Age, gender
11, 
and the number of e-mails and spam mails received all significantly affect the decision to install a 
spam filter. Furthermore, factors that we relate to reactance, such as the increase in time expendi-
tures for handling e-mails, the perceived increase of received spam mails, or the perception that 
spam mails are harmful to personal computers, increase the probability of installing a spam filter. 
The level of information about spam also positively affects installation decision. 
The propensity score distribution obtained from the logit estimation is depicted in Figure 1, 
which indicates that the PS distribution differs considerably between the treatment and the con-
trol group. Hence, NN matching algorithms without replacement would create poor matches due 
to the high-score users from the treatment group, which likely get matched to low-score users 
from the control group. The PS interval of treated (untreated) users is [0.033 – 0.999] ([0.048 – 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 In the case of a binary treatment, the estimation with either a logit or a probit model should yield similar results. 
We also estimate the propensity score using a probit model and obtain similar values. 
9 We also test for multicollinearity. All variables have variance inflation factor values < 10. 
10 Hit rates are computed as follows: If the estimated propensity score is greater than the sample proportion of users 
that have installed a spam filter (i.e.  P X P > ) ( ˆ ), observations are classified as 1. If  P X P ≤ ) ( ˆ , observations are classi-
fied as 0. 
11 Note that the sign for gender is now negative (as opposed to the bivariate analysis, Table 3), indicating that male 
users have a lower propensity to install a filter if a multivariate analysis is deployed that controls for relevant factors 
(Table 6).   
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0.931]). Hence, the common support (based on the MinMax criterion) lies between 0.048 and 
0.931; consequently, 74 treated users (treated off support) had to be dropped from our analysis.  
>> Insert Figure 1 about here << 
Matching Results 
We present three different matching estimators in our analysis: single NN matching (match-
ing estimator A hereafter), single NN matching with common support condition (matching esti-
mator B), and KM with common support condition (matching estimator C). For the KM estimator 
we use an Epanechnikov kernel function with a bandwidth parameter, according to Silverman 
(1986), of 0.06. 
12 In Table 7, we present our matching results. All estimated effects are negative, 
which indicates that the installation of a spam filter lowers average working time losses, regard-
less of the algorithm chosen. However, the absolute effects differ between the matching algo-
rithms.  
Matching estimator A (NN matching) does not impose the common support condition, result-
ing in an effect of -814.48 minutes. That is, the effect of installing a spam filter reduces working 
time losses by roughly 800 minutes. However, this result must be treated with caution for two 
reasons: First, no individuals are dropped from the analysis, so that even treated individuals that 
cannot be properly compared with untreated users are used to measure the effect, and some con-
trol individuals appear repeatedly; for example, one member of the control group gets used 72 
times. Second, any interpretation of these results should be preceded by an evaluation of match-
ing quality. To determine whether the matching procedure balances the distribution of covariates 
                                                 
12 We have tested several different bandwidths and distributions that all yield similar results. Detailed estimation 
results for all matching algorithms are available on request from the authors.   
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between both groups, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) propose using standardized biases (SB). 
Standardized biases before and after matching are defined as follows: 
)) ( ) ( ( 5 . 0
) (
;






X V X V
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where  )) ( ( ] 0 [ 1 ] 0 [ 1 X V X  is the mean (variance) in the treatment (control) group before matching, 
and  )) ( ( ] 0 [ 1 ] 0 [ 1 X V X M M  the corresponding values after matching. The SB after matching for esti-
mator A is highest at 15.64%. Even though this level represents a reduction compared with the 
situation before matching (20.12%), it is clearly not sufficient. In general, it is suggested that 
standardized  differences  should  be  below  5%  (Sianesi  2004;  Caliendo  and  Kopeinig  2008). 
Therefore, matching estimator A is not satisfactory, and we turn to the next two approaches.  
For estimators B and C, we impose common support conditions and drop 74 users from the 
treatment group (offsup). These estimators balance the covariate differences between the groups, 
and, through the matching procedure, more than 60% of the covariate differences are removed. In 
addition, Sianesi (2004) suggests re-estimating propensity scores on the matched sample, and 
comparing the pseudo-R
2 values before and after matching. The pseudo-R
2 after matching should 
be lower, because systematic differences in the distribution of the covariates between groups 
should have been removed by matching. In our analysis, we achieve pseudo-R
2 values of 0.247 
before and 0.062 (estimator B) and 0.024 (estimator C) after matching. 
>> Insert Table 7 about here << 
Table 7 shows that the use of matching estimator B does not balance the covariate distribu-
tion satisfactorily (bias aft > 5%), whereas using estimator C does. Consequently, we rely on es-
timator C as the appropriate measure, and find that the causal effect of a spam filter installation  
 
19
on working time losses equals approximately -439.52 minutes and is significant.
13 Therefore, in 
our sample, the installation of a spam filter is beneficial and decreases working time losses by 
more than 400 minutes per year. Although savings of approximately seven hours per year might 
not sound too impressive, it becomes more so if viewed within the organizational context. Con-
sider, for example, an average wage of 30 Euro per hour, and assume that 1,000 employees work 
for a company; the seven hours saved accumulate to a considerable sum that clearly exceeds the 
central costs associated with installing a spam filter mechanism. 
Effect Heterogeneity 
As we noted above, we observe considerable heterogeneity with regard to variables that cha-
racterize the usage intensity of e-mail communication, and we find that the decision to install a 
filter is strongly influenced by the intensity of e-mail communication. This notion implies that a 
spam filter might not be a necessary and efficient option for all users. Hence, we conducted 
group-specific matching procedures in order to uncover underlying factors that account for hete-
rogeneity in the magnitude of the treatment effect. The group-specific results in Table 8 show 
that the desired cost saving effects of a spam filter installation do not occur in any case, rather 
that the size and the direction of the effect depends on user characteristics.  
First, the number of spam mails received by an individual plays a central role in the cost ef-
fect of a spam filter. We see that a spam filter only saves costs for those users who are bothered 
by a large spam burden. For users who receive less than 10 spam mails per day, the cost effect of 
a spam filter is even positive. This implies that a spam filter does not save, but rather induces 
costs for users who only receive few spam mails; in these cases a manual identification and eli-
                                                 
13 To draw inferences about the significance of the effect, we report bootstrapped standard errors (s.e.) with 200 




mination will probably be more efficient. A likely reason is that the costs associated with the in-
stallation, training, and control of the filter exceed the beneficial effect of saving time through 
classification of e-mails. 
>> Insert Table 8 about here << 
Second, since the efficiency of spam filter training or manual handling of spam mails is like-
ly to depend on the individual’s know-how, we include the level of proficiency in dealing with 
spam in the group-specific analysis. If the cost effects of a spam filter are analyzed conditionally 
on how well informed the user is, we observe that significant cost-saving effects only occur when 
the user is not well informed concerning spam. If a user does not have a profound knowledge 
about spam, a manual inspection appears to be less efficient than an automatic classification; in 
this case, the filter uses information that can only be readily substituted by visual inspection as is 
the case of experienced users. For these well-informed users, the cost-saving effects are present 
but fail to be significant, indicating that an experienced user might as well rely on his or her pro-
ficiency to manually classify e-mails. 
Sensitivity to Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The validity of our estimates depends on the conditional independence assumption. For this 
assumption to be fulfilled, we must observe all variables that simultaneously influence the pro-
pensity to install a spam filter, and the outcome variable. Because of this very strong assumption, 
we validate whether unobserved heterogeneity might alter our results by applying the bounding 
approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002). The basic idea of this approach is to determine how 
strong an unobserved variable must be to influence the decision to install a spam filter and to 
change our matching results. Becker and Caliendo (2007), and DiPrete and Gangl (2004) provide  
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guidance for implementing this bounding approach in the case of a discrete or metric outcome 
variable. As a starting point, we assume that the propensity score is influenced not only by ob-
served variables X, but also by unobserved variables U, such that ( 1| ) P D X U β γ = + . If the se-
lection is based solely on observable variables X, the study is free of hidden bias, γ will be 0, and 
the installation probability will be determined solely by X. However, if a hidden bias exists, two 
individuals with the same observed covariates X will have differing chances of installing a spam 
filter.  
>> Insert Table 9 about here << 
By varying the influence of γ, we can examine the sensitivity of our results to two different 
scenarios. First, we consider a situation in which we underestimate (t-hat-) the true treatment ef-
fect; second, we address a situation in which we overestimate (t-hat+) the true treatment effect. 
For both scenarios, we re-estimate the test statistics (see Table 9) and check the significance of 
the coefficients. Given the negative estimated treatment effect, the bounds that emerge under the 
assumption that we have overestimated the true treatment effect are of less importance. The effect 
is significant at γ = 1 and becomes even more significant for increasing values of γ if we have 
overestimated the true treatment effect. However, the bounds under the assumption that we have 
underestimated the treatment effect reveal that even high levels of γ would not alter the signific-
ance of the results. To be more specific, at a value of γ = 1.8, the result remains significant at the 
5% level; at γ = 1.9, it would be still significant at the 10% level. Only at a γ-value of 2.0 do the 
results  become  insignificant.  However,  γ  =  2  implies  that  the  unobserved  component  in 
( 1| ) P D X U β γ = +  would have to be as strong as the observed component. Given the informa-
tive data at hand, this is rather unlikely; therefore, we can state that only very high levels of un-
observed heterogeneity would alter our results.  
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Conclusion and Limitations 
Our analysis shows that the existence of spam confronts organizations with significant ex-
penses, primarily in the form of working time losses. Every year, employees waste an average of 
1,200 minutes—or two working days—dealing with spam.  
When an organization decides to react by setting up a spam filter mechanism, it incurs further 
expenses, and the cost-saving effects have been unclear thus far. We clarify this situation by 
showing that spam filters can reduce individual spam-related costs. The effect is strong; cost sav-
ings accumulate to 439 minutes per person per year, and our findings are significant and insensi-
tive to unobserved heterogeneity. The magnitude of the different cost components also suggests 
that the primary concern in organizations should be the effectiveness of filter mechanisms on the 
individual level rather than central costs caused by spam. Due to the fact that cost-saving effects 
only occur for those users with an excessive spam load, those with little knowledge about spam, 
or those lacking adequate countermeasures, companies should primarily address these users in 
order to reduce costs through spam filters. For these users the installation of a spam filter will 
lead to the desired effect. If a user is well informed or is not strongly affected by spam, a compa-
ny should not encourage the implementation of technical countermeasures. In this case, manual 
inspections appear to be more efficient than filter mechanisms that tend to increase overall spam 
costs. 
We derive our conclusions by applying an econometric matching approach that controls for 
selection bias. It is unlikely that the selection bias is unique to our sample; rather, a selection bias 
probably poses a problem for a multitude of other research questions in IS. Within organizations, 
this effect might arise in evaluations of the effectiveness of optional IT innovations, for which an 
experimental setting is not available. Consider, for example, a mobile e-mail solution offered to  
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employees. To evaluate its effectiveness, the company cannot use a simple cross-sectional ap-
proach because the estimation cannot distinguish whether the outcome measure (e.g., efficiency) 
causes or is affected by adoption. A similar case might be made for adoptions of antivirus soft-
ware, optional SAP modules, and hardware (e.g., Blackberry). 
Comparisons between several organizations encounter a similar problem. Consider the intro-
duction of a new accounting software system. An efficiency evaluation cannot occur without cor-
recting for a sample selection bias because cross-sectional estimation procedures cannot distin-
guish whether efficient companies tend to be early adopters of new software, or whether the 
adoption of new software enhances their efficiency. Thus, when experimental settings are infeas-
ible, we recommend the application of a quasi-experimental setting that draws on matching pro-
cedures and thus provides a viable and efficient way to correct for sample selection bias. 
Finally, we note some limitations to our study. First, our research focuses on a single German 
university.  Studying  different  organizations  (companies)  with  different organizational  settings 
and  in  different  countries  would  certainly  yield  deeper  insights  into  this  important  matter. 
Second, the data we use is gathered through self-reported measures, which is common practice in 
research and provides generally accepted validity. However, a comparison with observed meas-
ures, perhaps in an experimental setting, might enhance generalizability. Third, though we dem-
onstrate the positive effects of spam filters on the individual and organizational levels, we cannot 
extend our findings to general welfare implications because it remains unclear whether spam fil-
ters represent the most efficient way to deal with spam in the long term. Some theoretical evi-
dence suggests that the widespread use of filters might even increase the overall amount of spam 
(Melville et al. 2006). This question therefore should be addressed by research in order to derive 





Becker, S.O. and M. Caliendo. 2004. Sensitivity analysis for average treatment effects. Stata 
Journal. 7(1) 71-83. 
Caliendo, M and S. Kopeinig. 2008. Some practical guidance for the implementation of propensi-
ty score matching. Journal of Economic Surveys. 22(1) 31-72. 
Cormack, G.V. and T.R. Lynam. 2007. Online supervised spam filter evaluation. ACM Transac-
tions on Information Systems,. 25(3) 1-31. 
Dewan, S. and F. Ren. 2007. Risk and return of information technology initiatives: Evidence 
from electronic commerce announcements. Information Systems Research. 18(4) 370-394. 
Dewan, S., C. Shi, and V. Gurbaxani. 2007. Investigating the risk-return relationship of informa-
tion  technology  investment:  Firm-level  empirical  analysis.  Management  Science.  53(12) 
1829-1842. 
DiPrete, T. and M. Gangl. 2004. Assessing bias in the estimation of causal effects: Rosenbaum 
bounds on matching estimators and instrumental variables estimation with imperfect instru-
ments. Sociological Methodology. 34(1) 271-310. 
Duan, Z., Y. Dong, and K. Gopalan. 2007. DMTP: Controlling spam through message delivery 
differentiation. Computer Networks. 51 2616-2630. 
Falkinger, J. 2007. Attention economies. Journal of Economic Theory. 133 266-294. 
Goodman, J., G.V. Cormack, and D. Heckerman. 2007. Spam and the ongoing battle for the in-
box. Communications of the ACM. 50(2) 25-31. 
Hann, I.-H., K.-L. Hui, Y.-L. Lai, S.Y.T. Lee, and I.P.L. Png. 2006. Who gets spammed? Com-
munications of ACM. 49(10) 83-87.  
 
25
Harrison, G.W. and J.A. List. 2004. Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature. 42(4) 
1009-1055. 
Heckman, J., R. LaLonde, and J. Smith. 1999. The economics and econometrics of active labor 
market programs. in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds), Handbook of Labor Economics. Vol 
III 1865–2097. Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Heckman, J.J., H. Ichimura, J. Smith, and P. Todd. 1998. Characterizing selection bias using ex-
perimental data. Econometrica. 66(5) 1017-1098. 
Imbens, G.W. 2004. Nonparametric estimation of average treatment effects under exogeneity: A 
review. Review of Economics and Statistics. 86(1) 4-29. 
Joseph, K. and A. Thevaranjan. 2008. Investigating pricing solutions to combat spam: Postage 
stamp and bonded senders. Journal of Interactive Marketing. Forthcoming. 
Kraut, R.E., S. Sunder, R. Telang, and J. Morris. 2005. Pricing electronic mail to solve the prob-
lem of spam. Human-Computer Interaction. 20 195-223. 
Lechner, M. 2002. Some practical issues in the evaluation of heterogeneous labour market pro-
grammes by matching methods. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, A. 165 59-82. 
MAAWG. 2007. Email metrics program - the network operators' perspective, report #5 - first 
quarter  2007.  (accessed  Jan.  12,  2008),  [available  at 
http://www.maawg.org/about/MAAWG20071Q_Metrics_Report.pdf]. 
Melville, N., A. Stevens, R.K. Plice, and O.V. Pavlov. 2006. Unsolicited commercial e-mail: 
Empirical  analysis  of  a  digital  commons.  International  Journal  of  Electronic  Commerce. 
10(4) 143-168. 
Messagelabs.  2008.  2007  annual  security  report.  (Accessed  Jan.  12,  2008),  [available  at 
http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/MLI_2007_Annual_Security_ Report.pdf].  
 
26
Morimoto, M. and S. Chang. 2006. Consumers' attitudes toward unsolicited commercial e-mail 
and postal direct mail marketing methods: Intrusiveness, perceived loss of control, and irrita-
tion. Journal of Interactive Advertising. 7(1) 8-20. 
OECD.  2005.  Spam  issues  in  developing  countries,  http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/47/ 
34935342.pdf. 
Park, J.S. and A. Deshpande. 2006. Spam detection: Increasing accuracy with a hybrid solution. 
Information Systems Management. 23(1) 57-67. 
Pavlov, O., N. Melville, and R. Plice. 2008. Toward a Sustainable Email Marketing Infrastruc-
ture. Journal of Business Research. Forthcoming 
Rosenbaum, P.R. 2002. Observational studies Springer, New York. 
Rosenbaum, P.R. and D.B. Rubin. 1983. The central role of the propensity score in observational 
studies for causal effects. Biometrika. 70(1) 41-50. 
Rosenbaum, P.R. and D.B. Rubin. 1985. Constructing a control group using multivariate matched 
sampling methods that incorporate the propensity score. The American Statistician. 39(1) 33-
38. 
Roy, A. 1951. Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings. Oxford Economic Papers. 3(2) 135-
145. 
Rubin, D.B. 1974. Estimating causal effects to treatments in randomised and nonrandomised stu-
dies. Journal of Educational Psychology. 66(5) 688-701. 
Sahami, M., S. Dumais, D. Heckerman, and E. Horvitz (1998), "A Bayesian approach to filtering 
junk e-mail," in AAAI'98 Workshop on Learning for Text Categorization. Madison, Wiscon-
sin. 
Sianesi, B. 2004. An evaluation of swedish system of active labour market programmes in the 
1990s. The Review of Economic and Statistics. 86(1) 133-155.  
 
27
Sipior, J.C., B.T. Ward, and P.G. Bonner. 2004. Should spam be on the menu? Communications 
of the ACM. 47(6) 59-63. 
Smith, J.A. and P.E. Todd. 2005. Does matching overcome LaLonde's critique of nonexperimen-
tal estimators? Journal of Econometrics. 125(1-2) 305-353. 
Union, E. 2004. Communication from the commission to the european parliament, the council, 
the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions on unsolicited 
commercial communications or ‘spam’. (accessed January 19, 2008), [available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/com2004_0028en01.pdf]. 
Vircom. 2004. Why spammers spam, White Paper at www.vircom.com. 
Yoo, S.-H., C.-O. Shin, and S.-J. Kwak. 2006. Inconvenience cost of spam mail: A contingent 
valuation study. Applied Economics Letters. 13(14) 933-936. 
Zhang, L. 2005. The CAN-SPAM act: An insufficient response to the growing spam problem. 





Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Central costs 
Nonrecurring tasks  Time Expenditure  Costs 
Administrative tasks (e. g., coordination of privacy concerns, legal and 
organizational clearance). 
58 hours  Euro 1,740 
Acquisition costs for hard- and software  -  Euro 3,000 
Setup of infrastructure (e. g., installation, training)  78 hours  Euro 2,340 
Recurring costs     
Maintenance and further development, support, training  268 hours  Euro 8,040 
Total costs for provider  404 hours  Euro 15,120 
 
 
Table 2: Spam-induced working time losses 




Number of observations    1000  527  473 
Time expenditure per year 
Index = (w1·250)+w2+w3+w4+w5+w6+w7 







(w1) Time expenditure for daily spam 
treatment
a 
Daily  4.87 
(6.70) 
   
(w2) Time expenditure for finding universi-
ty spam filter
a 
Research1  17.03 
(20.11) 
   
(w3) Time expenditure for university filter 
installation
a 
Installation1  15.68 
(18.87) 
   
(w4) Time expenditure for filter installation 
by assistant
a 
Installation2  11.73 
(11.63) 
   
(w5) Time expenditure for finding alterna-
tive filter
a 
Research2  53.34 
(54.83) 
   
(w6) Time expenditure for installation of 
alternative filter
a 
Installation3  34.40 
(72.23) 
   
(w7) Time expenditure for installation of 
alternative filter by assistant
a 
Installation4  23.37 
(21.24) 
   
*** / ** / * Statistical difference (two-sided t-test) from D = 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
aVariable measured in minutes.  




Table 3: Individual factors 




Number of observations    1000  527  473 















Spam = (w1·w2) / 100 







(w1) Number of e-mail per 
day 







(w2) Spam share (in %) 
 







Spam prevention         
(w1) Avoided to publish e-
mail address on website
a 






(w2) Avoided transfer of e-
mail address
a 






(w3) Alternative e-mail 
address was used
a 







(w4) Uncommon e-mail 
address was used
a 






(w5) Requested removal 
from e-mail-lists
a 







Spam control         
(w1) Inspection of sender






(w2) Inspection of subject







(w3) Inspection by opening 
e-mail
a 






Level of information on 
spam
a 







*** / ** / * Statistical difference (two-sided t-test) from D = 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
aVariable measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = disagree – 5 = agree). 




Table 4: Reactance 




Number of observations    1000  527  473 
Behavioral changes         
(w1) Usage of e-mail was reduced







(w2) Time expenditures for e-mails 
have been increased
a 







(w3) Confidence in e-mail was 
reduced
a 







Spam sensitivity          
(w1) Advertising e-mail from un-
known sender
a 






(w2) Unsolicited e-mail by political or 
other organization
a 






(w3) Unsolicited e-mail by non-
commercial organization
a 














(w5) Advertising e-mail from business 
partners
a 







(w6) E-mail with large attachment







(w7) Solicited commercial e-mail






Spam properties         
(w1) Spam e-mail is unsolicited







(w2) Spam surge cannot be stopped






(w3) Spam e-mail is potentially harm-
ful for own computer
a 







(w4) Perceived amount of spam  
received
a 







(w5) Perceived magnitude of time 
expenses for spam
a 







*** / ** / * Statistical difference (two-sided t-test) from D = 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
aVariable measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = disagree – 5 = agree). 




Table 5: Distribution of e-mail addresses 




Number of observation    1000  527  473 
Distribution of e-mail address to known contacts         
(w1) E-mail address was distributed to colleagues / 
business partners
b 






(w2) E-mail address was distributed to friends / ac-
quaintances
b 






Distribution of e-mail address to unknown contacts         
(w1) E-mail address was published on websites







(w2) E-mail address was published in online directo-
ries
b 







(w3) E-mail address was published in online forums







(w4) E-mail address was used when signing up for 
newsletters or webpages
b 






*** / ** / * Statistical difference (two-sided t-test) from D = 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
b Variable measured as binary variable (0/1).  




Table 6: Estimation results of the Logit model 




















Age  .049 
***  .0089 0.000
Gender  -.334 
**  .1667 0.045
Quantity  .016 
***  .0044 0.000
E-mail  .040 
***  .0156 0.010
Website  .070  .0597 0.244
Transfer  .023  .0651 0.719
Alternative  .006  .0529 0.912
Uncommon  .009  .1021 0.932
Removal  .024  .0565 0.668
Sender  .001  .1425 0.992
Subject  .189  .1412 0.182
Open  -.135  .0839 0.107
Infolevel  .794 











Reduction  .083  .1126 0.462
Timeincrease  .115 
*  .0712 0.105
Confidence  -.008  .0715 0.912
Unknown  .031  .1433 0.827
Advertising1  .090  .0653 0.168
Fun  .003  .0701 0.966
Attachment  .015  .0767 0.843
Advertise2  .207 
*  .1348 0.125
Advertise3  -.236  .1526 0.122
Solicited  .003  .0805 0.965
PercAmount  .165 
*  .0851 0.053
PercTime  -.037  .0814 0.651
Unsolicited  .145  .0987 0.142
Damage  -.172 
**  .0732 0.019














Friends  -.082  .1688 0.628
Colleagues  -.165  .2941 0.575
Publwebsites  .241  .2017 0.233
Directories  .236 
*  .1721 .0170
Forum  .583  .3720 0.117
Newsletter  .027  .1796 0.883
  Const.  -5.96 
***  1.224 0.000
Notes: Number of observations: 960; Pseudo-R
2=0.247. 





Table 7: Matching results 
Est.  Effect  s.e.  t-value  offsup  biasbef  biasaft  R
2after 
A  -814.48  379.34  -2.15  0  20.12  15.64  0.119 
B  -468.37  275.04  -1.70  74  20.12  8.30  0.062 








Number of users outside common support region. 
Mean standardized bias (over all variables used in PS-specification) before matching. 
Mean standardized bias after matching. 
A(B): Nearest Neighbor Matching without (with) common support condition,  
C: Kernel matching (Epanechnikow kernel function, bandwidth parameter: 0.06) with common 
support condition. 
Standard errors based on 200 bootstrap replications.  
 
Table 8: Group analysis: matching results (group-specific scores) 
Obs.  Effect  s.e.  t-value  offsup  biasbef  biasaft  R
2after 
Number of spam mails <=10 
n(D=1): 232 
n(D=0): 357 
156.96  86.14  1.82  14  14.84  4.35  0.019 
Number of spam mails >10 
n(D=1): 288 
n(D=0): 83 
-688.73  397.40  -1.73  62  16.25  9.75  0.069 
Level of information on spam <3 
n(D=1): 152 
n(D=0): 271 
-528.92  301.67  -1.75  3  17.32  5.9  0.028 
Level of information on spam >=3 
n(D=1): 368 
n(D=0): 169 







Number of users outside common support region. 
Mean standardized bias (over all variables used in PS-specification) before matching. 
Mean standardized bias after matching. 
Kernel matching (Epanechnikow kernel function, bandwidth parameter: 0.06) with common 
support condition. 




Table 9: Sensitivity analysis, unobserved heterogeneity 




CI+  CI- 




-663.714  -317.766 




-737.963  -258.395 




-790.884  -211.95 




-833.384  -173.577 




-872.107  -140.304 




-908.88  -105.836 




-948.688  -71.8773 




-990.629  -37.0085 




-1023.3  -3.449 




-1053.24  27.0441 




-1083.04  54.8713 
Gamma: log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
Sig+: upper bound significance level 
Sig-: lower bound significance level 
t-hat+: upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
t-hat-: lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
CI+: upper bound confidence interval (a=  .95) 




Figure 1: Distribution of the Propensity Score. Common Support 
 
Note: This figure shows the distribution of the propensity score for individuals who installed a spam filter 
(upper half) and those who did not (lower half). According to the MinMax-criterion 74 users from the first 
group must be exluded from the analysis (Treated off support), because their propensity score values lie 
outside the region of common support. 
 